Update on Security Council Reform Consultations

New York, 5 April 2007 – Consultations on Security Council reform took place throughout March, as the five co-facilitators attempted to assess elements of common ground between member states and possible guiding principles for an agreement. The facilitators are drafting their assessment report this week and plan to submit it to the President of the General Assembly, Sheika Haya Rashed Al Khalifa, next week (9-13 April). Below are highlights of recent discussions including the facilitators’ informal comments on prospects for an agreement.

Summary

Discussion on Security Council reform was divided into five themes earlier this year (24 January) – size of an enlarged Council, regional representation, question of the veto, working methods of the Council and its relationship with the General Assembly, and categories of membership.

The overlap between the themes was widely noted, and although separate, parallel consultations were held on each theme, a final interactive panel discussion was held to discuss them all at once and consolidate trends and potential areas of consensus.

Relatively new developments:

Delegations moved away from promoting either “gradual” or “big-bang” reform, acknowledging that any expansion would be significant. Many also recognized that for an agreement to be reached, all decisions will need to be temporary or transitional. This led to frequent mention of a required review conference after some years, at which the success of reforms would be assessed.

Some small states advocated for reconfiguring the current regional groupings. But the majority of member states wished to leave the five regional groups as they are.

A new type of membership, the renewable seat as introduced by Panama, offers the benefits of both greater accountability than the permanent seats, as well as more effective decision-making than is possible with frequent turn-over of members. This model does not currently have consensus support, however.

Reportedly all members (including the permanent members) agree on enlarging the Council. The total, final number of members, however, has been difficult for states to decide.

One aspect of reforms that permanent members have not supported is changing the use or weight of the veto, several options for which were proposed in consultations. Facilitators noted that the veto question was far from resolved, and some delegations were willing to postpone agreement in favor of moving forward with other reforms. Members of the African Union, notably, hinted at flexibility on extending the veto power to new permanent members.

According to facilitators, the three predominant options for expansion, by the end of this round of consultations, were:

Add both permanent and non-permanent seats, increase accountability, and leave the veto as an open question to be dealt with later;

Increase both permanent and non-permanent seats, giving new permanent members all the privileges of current permanent members (including veto); and

Create flexibility in establishing new types of seats with non-permanent status only.

There was broad support for the idea that improvements in transparency and accessibility would lessen the pressure on the Council to enlarge membership. There was almost no insistence, unlike in past discussions, that working methods reform should not go forward without agreement on enlargement.

Next steps could include: additional consultations, the drafting of a proposal for negotiations, an informal “straw poll” in the General Assembly to test support for proposals.

The President of the General Assembly is expected to give guidance on how to proceed next week.

Outline of Consultation Process

Each of the five facilitators appointed by President Al Khalifa (the ambassadors of Chile, Croatia, Cyprus, Netherlands, and Tunisia) on 8 February held plenary consultations and other types of meetings on the five themes currently under discussion. In the course of these consultations, 173 statements were made by delegations. The facilitators also consulted bilaterally with member states as well as “interest groups.” On 13 March they held an interactive panel discussion on all five themes. The purpose of the panel was to discuss the areas of overlap between the five themes and to discuss all five elements at once, for the first time.

Following the panel discussion, consultations continued until yesterday, 2 April, when two meetings were held for the facilitators to meet with members of the Non-aligned Movement (NAM), followed by a meeting with members of the Rio Group.[1] Those meetings aimed to address any last-minute issues raised by the member states before the facilitators reported to President Al Khalifa next week.

President Al Khalifa is expected to determine the next steps in the process on the basis of the facilitators’ reports. Depending on their assessment of progress, she may recommend further consultations, or alternatively negotiations on a draft proposal. Unless the facilitators are very optimistic, she likely will convene further consultations, according to President Al Khalifa’s spokesperson.

Key Themes Discussed

Ambassador Heraldo Munoz of Chile, facilitating the discussion on “size of an enlarged Security Council,” noted during the panel discussion that reform of the Security Council should aim to increase access for non-members, and he pointed out two ways to accomplish that: enlarging the membership, and increasing transparency about the Council’s work.

Within this overarching idea, roughly eight key themes emerged from the discussion between delegations at the 13 March panel meeting and other consultations.

Gradual vs. “Big Bang” Approach to Reform:

Regarding the pace and ambitiousness of reform, proceeding gradually was a major topic of discussion. Some suggested that adding Council seats in small increments over the course of many years – a transitional expansion – would allow for earlier agreement than attempting to agree on all aspects ahead of time. Other states refuted this dichotomy, explaining that any change will, by default, be gradual. A vocal minority expressed concern about undertaking a gradual approach without first establishing an end goal to work towards. Some argued that calling a decision “final” would ensure its failure in a vote. A better approach, it was suggested, would be to make “temporary” arrangements, to be reviewed after some years.
Another interpretation of transitional reform is to add explicitly transitional seats, as Panama has proposed. This new type of member would be considered semi-permanent, i.e. eligible for re-election after each term; these seats also have been called intermediate seats. Ambassador Ali Hachani of Tunisia, who has been facilitating consultations on “categories of membership,” asked delegations whether a scheme that included this type of member would be acceptable, especially if it was to be revisited at a later date, i.e. in a review conference? Further, he asked, what would the key elements of an intermediate category be? Regarding accountability for members, would it be acceptable for elected (non-permanent or intermediate) members to represent their regions? Responses to this affirmed the need for a review mechanism. They also highlighted the importance of improved working methods for true accountability of all members; the chance for re-election is regarded as contributing to accountability but not a guarantee of it.
Facilitators raised the possibility of adding further criteria to help in the selection of new member states for the seats. Criteria mentioned by delegations included: membership in the UN (i.e. no real criteria), financial contributions, troop contributions, adherence to the UN Charter, and population.
Regarding the size of the Council, the final number of members has been difficult for states to agree on. However, there reportedly are no members who oppose enlarging the Council – including the permanent members. While some have stressed that change should be modest and moderate, the permanent members have not threatened to oppose the addition of new seats on the Council. As of 2 April, the facilitators had not observed sufficient consensus on a favored model. They summarized the three predominant options:
- Add both permanent and non-permanent seats, increase accountability, leaving the veto as an open question to be dealt with later;
- Increase both permanent and non-permanent seats, giving new permanent members all the privileges of current permanent members; and
- Create flexibility in establishing new types of seats with non-permanent status only.

NAM members referred to their official position as resolved at the 2006 Havana Summit. According to this position, non-permanent membership enlargement should be the focus of reform until members can reach a final decision regarding new permanent members.

Small States’ Interests:

Many small states reported being excluded from the decisions made by the Security Council and a lack of access to information on the basis for those decisions. Some small states do not aspire to membership on the Council; they said they want to the council to function effectively and transparently with or without them as members and to be accountable to the entire membership.

In the panel discussion, there was wide support for addressing these concerns. Several delegations acknowledged that dramatic improvements in transparency and other working methods reforms could lessen the pressure on the Council to enlarge membership, as members would have other ways to access the Council’s work and decision-making processes.

Question of Veto:

For many states, the veto was a “terrible mistake” that now puts the Security Council outside of international law and thus undermines its credibility. Ambassador Munoz summarizes views on the veto: there is a “widespread desire to limit its application, and [for some states] to eliminate it.” However, the obstacles to removing it are recognized by many – it would require a Charter amendment, and therefore the consent of the five states that currently hold the veto. A few delegations recognized some validity in the veto power: that it is part of the history of the UN’s development, that it is embedded (indirectly) in the Charter (Article 27); had been established at a time when the permanent five had a great deal of influence over international peace and security at a veto privilege was the international community’s “price” for their cooperation in maintaining world stability.
The three primary proposals regarding the veto are: to grant veto power to any new permanent members; extend it to new members with the condition that it cannot be used before a review session on the issue; and not to give new permanent members veto power. Additional proposals are to restrict the veto’s use in certain issues, and to create a “weighted veto” in which more than one vote against a resolution from a veto-holding country would be required to effectively veto a Council decision.
Another suggestion is to balance the veto power by increasing the number of votes needed to pass a resolution, making it more difficult to pass a resolution but placing the power to impose that difficulty with the majority of members, not only the five permanent members.
The African Union has 53 members, whose governments have officially endorsed the position, making it an influential block in any negotiations on Security Council reform. The official position of the African Union is that new permanent members should have the same powers as current members, i.e. the right to veto, but at the panel discussion some members showed openness to flexibility on that position, depending on what alternative scenarios emerge.
Some states voiced support for “parking” the question of veto powers for the present, so as to proceed on less contentious aspects of reform and bring about some concrete change.
In the 2 April meeting, facilitators noted that opinions regarding the veto remained highly disparate and agreement still seemed far off.

Review Mechanism:

There was broad support for a “review clause” in any eventual resolution on Security Council reform. A review conference would meet after an undetermined number of years to evaluate the success of agreed reforms.

Consultations and Negotiations Process:

Some states seemed eager to negotiate on a proposal, or even to schedule a vote in the General Assembly as a reliable gauge of support for a certain model of reform. They expressed an interest in grappling with a concrete proposal now that many aspects of the reform dilemma have been thoroughly contemplated in various consultations. Others were wary of “rushing” to that stage before sufficient consensus around the elements for a resolution was built in informal settings. They warned that acting prematurely could undo the progress that had been made towards agreement so far. An informal “straw poll” to test support for proposals was mentioned, but others argued that any informal mechanism would be inaccurate for quantifying support.
NAM states in particular wanted to move toward a resolution on working methods and the General Assembly-Security Council relationship, while questions of enlargement are still under discussion within the membership as a whole.
There were hints of flexibility on issues where there had not been before, i.e. African states’ positions on the veto, which may make the possibility of a negotiable draft resolution seem more feasible.
NAM states encouraged the facilitators to continue with the current approach of consultations and reporting to the President of the GA to gain guidance on the next steps.

Role of General Assembly in Peace and Security Issues:

According to Ambassador Munoz a commonly held view is that that there is a need to limit the “encroachment” of the SC on the purview of the General Assembly. This refers to the perception that the concept of security is broadening, for example to include environmental threats to security. Many delegations stressed the need to address this shifting definition. There was no agreement on whether some overlap between the two bodies would be acceptable on certain issues, or whether it was necessary to strictly delineate the roles of each body. Reportedly there is more support for the latter view.

Working Methods and Enlargement:

The relationship between enlargement and working methods reform was discussed at length. In particular, an idea to advance two simultaneous resolutions, one on each type of reform, was voiced and responded to. Some states thought the two types of reform could be pursued separately; there was almost no insistence, unlike in past discussions, that working methods reform should not go forward without agreement on enlargement.

Ambassador Frank Majoor of the Netherlands, the facilitator on “working methods of the Security Council and the relationship between the Security Council and the General Assembly,” suggested that membership on the Council will continue to be limited, no matter how the enlargement issue is resolved, because membership will still be a rare occasion for all but the permanent members. He asked delegations for ideas on other ways of increasing access, other than enlargement, such as: access at the regional level, access for countries on the Council’s agenda and for troop-contributing countries.
An important difference between these two types of reform is that changing the Council’s working methods does not require an amendment to the UN Charter; enlargement does. Many states want to go forward with reform on the WM to improve transparency and access without waiting for an agreement on enlargement. It is not disputed that enlargement would entail additional changes in the WM, such as majority numbers for voting, etc. One option is to begin with small changes to working methods to create more transparency and accountability of the Council, followed by the expansion of Council membership, which in turn would dictate more working methods changes.

Regional Representation:

Ambassador Mirjana Mladineo of Croatia, facilitating discussion on the “question of regional representation,” asked delegations the following:
- Thoughts on “equitable geographic distribution” of seats, and the possibility of regional seats.
- Should the current regional structure be maintained? If so, how can it be equitably distributed?
- An acceptable solution for your country?
- Thoughts on regional seats, and ensuring accountability. Also, how would a Charter-consistent voting pattern be operationalized?
- What is the minimum acceptable total number of Security Council members?
- How can the legitimate concerns of small and medium states be acknowledged?

Few of these questions were answered directly. Opinions differ on the use of regional groups to redress the Council’s imbalances. The Japanese delegation outlined the several ways to understand the question of regions. It could mean:
- Regional representation, which would alter the Council makeup to allow for a greater presence for regions that are currently insufficiently represented. This would require an amendment to the UN Charter.
- Making the regional grouping structure more geographically equitable. Japan suggested that the time is not yet right for a total review.
- Regional arrangements for the selection of candidates, on a “pro bono” basis between states. Japan regarded this possibility as worthwhile for some regions. Several states suggested that treating the seats as regional, and leaving it up to each region to select their representatives, would only be successful for the African Union.

Facilitators said on 2 April that the large majority of member states wished to leave the current five regional groups as they are, although some small states advocate for a review and reconfiguration of the groupings.

Participation of Permanent (P-5) Members

Several delegations observed that the five permanent members of the Council spoke little during this round of consultation.

The facilitators said that so far permanent members had not opposed expansion but wished for only small changes. They were not open to all aspects of proposed reforms, in particular changing the use and/or weight of the veto. Reportedly at least some of the permanent members have suggested that they would attempt to apply self-constraint in using the veto.

However, their true reactions will be known only upon beginning formal negotiations over a proposal.

Next Steps

The co-facilitators will report to the President of the General Assembly on all themes next week (April 9-13). The next step will be determined by President Al Khalifa. She may recommend additional consultations, or she may ask for a proposal to be drafted, upon which delegations would then begin negotiations. One option is to negotiate on two simultaneous resolutions, one on working methods reform and one on enlargement.

Useful Resources

Facilitator’s Non-paper on Question of Veto (21 February 2007)

UN Charter articles 23, 27, 31, relevant to Security Council reform

Letter from President of the General Assembly on Points to Consider during Consultations (16 February 2007)

Update from Center for UN Reform Education on Security Council consultations, 20-23 February

*ReformtheUN.org will soon make available an updated chart of member states’ positions on the various elements of Security Council reform.*

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